Representative vs. Direct Democracy and Government Spending in a Median Voter Model

David L Chicoine, N Walzer and Steven Deller ()

Public Finance = Finances publiques, 1989, vol. 44, issue 2, 225-36

Abstract: Combining economics and the political process, demand-oriented median voter models provide a framework for analyzing local government budgetary behavior. Using observations from Illinois townships (operating under representative democracy) and Minnesota townships (operating under direct democracy), the institutional structure of collective decision-making in the provision of essential rural road services is studied. Institutional structure was found to be important in analyzing local government behavior with a median voter model. The difficulty of reducing a complex tax system into a representative tax-price variable proved to be a limiting factor in obtaining more conclusive results.

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:44:y:1989:i:2:p:225-36

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