Tax Evasion and Tax Revenue Loss: Another Elaboration of the Peacock-Shaw Approach

Walburga von Zameck

Public Finance = Finances publiques, 1989, vol. 44, issue 2, 308-15

Abstract: Introducing, besides the direct tax, an indirect tax in the tax evasion model of Peacock-Shaw (1982) as a simultaneous determinant of tax collections and assuming a uniform marginal propensity to consumer for declared and undeclared income, tax yield diminishes due to tax evasion if c

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:44:y:1989:i:2:p:308-15

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