Excise Taxation and the Theory of Tax Exploitation

William J Hunter and Michael Nelson

Public Finance = Finances publiques, 1990, vol. 45, issue 2, 268-82

Abstract: Individual preference for public goods and tax regimes are modeled in a utility-maximizing framework and the implications of the model are explored within the context of a median voter process. It is demonstrated that excise taxes, judiciously selected, may offer a political majority an excellent vehicle to shift a disproportionate share of the cost of government onto a minority. A central hypothesis that evolves from the model is that support for an excise tax rises as the percent of the population consuming that base falls. Empirical evidence is observed for state excise taxes levied on beer and cigarettes.

Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:45:y:1990:i:2:p:268-82

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Public Finance = Finances publiques
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().