Economics at your fingertips  

One-shot exogenous interventions increase subsequent coordination in Denmark, Spain and Ghana

Anna Lou Abatayo () and Bo Thorsen ()

PLOS ONE, 2017, vol. 12, issue 11, 1-19

Abstract: Everyday, we are bombarded with periodic, exogenous appeals and instructions on how to behave. How do these appeals and instructions affect subsequent coordination? Using experimental methods, we investigate how a one-time exogenous instruction affects subsequent coordination among individuals in a lab. Participants play a minimum effort game repeated 5 times under fixed matching with a one-time behavioral instruction in either the first or second round. Since coordination behavior may vary across countries, we run experiments in Denmark, Spain and Ghana, and map cross-country rankings in coordination with known national measures of fractualization, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation. Our results show that exogenous interventions increase subsequent coordination, with earlier interventions yielding better coordination than later interventions. We also find that cross-country rankings in coordination map with published national measures of fractualization, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation.

Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (text/html) ... 87840&type=printable (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0187840

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in PLOS ONE from Public Library of Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by plosone ().

Page updated 2022-06-16
Handle: RePEc:plo:pone00:0187840