Cruel Altruism

Jiri Hlavacek and Michal Hlaváček

Prague Economic Papers, 2005, vol. 2005, issue 4, 363-374

Abstract: This article shows that the altruism of the donator could have different forms. The specific form of his optimisation criterion significantly influences his decision making concerning the allocation of his resources among recipients. Moreover, even within one chosen criterion we could report sudden changes in strategy of a rational donator. This donator, even if he is so called ""hard altruist"" (i.e . subject preferring community interests to his individual interests), he could be forced to make a ""gambit"", when he sacrifices one from the subjects supported in favour of survival of the community as a whole. This preferring of whole community to individual interests could lead to liquidation of the least resistant member of the community. This is quite surprising as this member of the community was the most heavily supported before. Altruism could be cruel.

Keywords: altruism; donator and recipient; criteria of donators (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.271

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