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Generalized Coase Theorem

Jiri Hlavacek and Michal Hlaváček

Prague Economic Papers, 2011, vol. 2011, issue 4, 329-347

Abstract: In this article two original microeconomic models of an externality market are described: (1) model of optimal financial compensation of a damage caused by a negative externality in the economy with agents maximizing probability of their survival (generalized Coase Theorem) and (2) generalized model of optimal financial favour for agents provided a positive externality. Results of the models are compared with the outcomes of the standard microeconomics of subjects maximizing their own profit.

Keywords: negative externalities; marketable permits for exhalations; generalized Coase Theorem; maximizing of the probability of economic survival; positive externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.403

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