Mezibankovní spolupráce při riziku úpadku bank

Risk of Contagious Failures and Interbank Cooperative Arrangements

Olivier de Bandt

Politická ekonomie, 1997, vol. 1997, issue 3, 374-389

Abstract: The paper studies a possibility of creation of structure interbank cooperative arrangements with the goal to cut down a risk of failure. An attention concentrates on mutually ex-post help among banks which applies for deposit but faced the risk of portfolio that is not exante diversified. An effort of banks to cut down the risk them motivates to a sharing risk. In a tests to explain a role of clearing bank and willingness of banks to tie up themselves behaviour by strength rules for intervention are use numerous features of accessible models but the main focus is on moral hazard.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://polek.vse.cz/doi/10.18267/j.polek.283.html (text/html)
free of charge

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:1997:y:1997:i:3:id:283:p:374-389

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Redakce Politické ekonomie, Vysoká škola ekonomická, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3
http://polek.vse.cz

DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.283

Access Statistics for this article

Politická ekonomie is currently edited by Jiřina Bulisová

More articles in Politická ekonomie from Prague University of Economics and Business Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stanislav Vojir ().