 Řízení a správa společností a zbytkové státní vlastnictví (dva kvalitativní nedostatky privatizace v tranzitivních zemích)Corporate governance and residual state property (two qualitative shortcomings of privatization in transition countries)Wladimir Andreff Politická ekonomie, 2000, vol. 2000, issue 3 Abstract: The privatization in transition countries generated distorsions. Among the most dangerous distorsions are those introduced by a non legal or criminal privatization of management with the help of former or new informal networks connecting managers to the irregular economy and to some extent to the mafia. State regulation is required to control again monopoly power in privatized utilities and sectors where private stakes have won privileged position. It should be better to recognize the unavoidable role of the state in economic restructuring and use its intervention as a complementary - rather than an antagonistic - tool of the economic transition. Keywords: privatization; transition countries; state regulation; criminal or non legal activities; corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2000:y:2000:i:3:id:145 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.145 Access Statistics for this article Politická ekonomie is currently edited by Jiřina Bulisová More articles in Politická ekonomie from Prague University of Economics and Business Contact information at EDIRC. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.