K problému asymetrie informace v pojišťovnictví

Observations regarding the issue of asymmetric information in insurance

Jaroslav Daňhel

Politická ekonomie, 2002, vol. 2002, issue 6

Abstract: The 2001 Nobel Prize award to three American scientists for their theoretical contribution to analysis of markets with asymmetrical information has reawakened debates on the behavior and decision-making of economic players under uncertainty. Because insurance is a classic example of such a situation, it is used to illustrate the cases of asymmetry, for the client is supposed to know better his own exposure than the insurer. In fact, the client's objective exposure a priori cannot be quantified from the point of view of exact sciences and his decision is further influenced by psychological or sociological factors. The insurer is better equipped to make calculations, drawing on past experience and using the laws of statistics, furthermore, he takes antiselection into account.

Keywords: decision under uncertainty; insurance market; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.18267/j.polek.388

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