Listinné akcie na majitele a veřejné zakázky
Bearer Shares in Paper Form and Public Procurement
Petr Janský () and
Politická ekonomie, 2012, vol. 2012, issue 3, 349-361
This article examines for the first time the relationship between transparency of ownership structure and (i) profits of firms winning public procurement contracts and (ii) competition for the contracts and savings of the public authority. These characteristics are compared for two groups of public procurement contract winners that differ by their ownership structure. The detailed data from the Czech Republic are used and the firms with bearer shares in paper form serve as the less transparent firms. The results show that less transparent firms have significantly higher profit margins in terms of tens of percentage points and participate in less competitive public procurement contracts and result into lower savings for the public authority. This could be an indirect indicator of conflict of interests or corruption. The article concludes with policy recommendations.
Keywords: profitability; Czech Republic; corruption; Public Procurement; bearer shares; bearer shares in paper form; ownership structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H57 L14 L25 M14 O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:prg:jnlpol:v:2012:y:2012:i:3:id:846:p:349-361
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