Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

V Bhaskar, George Mailath and Stephen Morris

Review of Economic Dynamics, 2008, vol. 11, issue 3, 515-528

Abstract: This paper investigates the Harsanyi (1973)-purifiability of mixed strategies in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with perfect monitoring. We perturb the game so that in each period, a player receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and periods. We focus on the purifiability of one-period memory mixed strategy equilibria used by Ely and Valimaki (2002) in their study of the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring. We find that any such strategy profile is not the limit of one-period memory equilibrium strategy profiles of the perturbed game, for almost all noise distributions. However, if we allow infinite memory strategies in the perturbed game, then any completely-mixed equilibrium is purifiable. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Keywords: Purification; Belief-free equilibria; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (2007)
Working Paper: Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (2006)
Working Paper: Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (2006)
Working Paper: Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (2004)
Working Paper: Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (2004)
Working Paper: Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (2004)
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DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2007.10.004

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