Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

V Bhaskar

No 136, 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: receives a private payoff shock which is independently and identically distributed across players and periods. We focus on the purifiability of a class of one-period memory mixed strategy equilibria used by \cite{ElyValimaki02} in their study of the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring. We find that all such strategy profiles are not the limit of one-period memory equilibrium strategy profiles of the perturbed game, for almost all noise distributions. However, if we allow infinite memory strategies in the perturbed game, then any completely-mixed equilibrium is purifiable.

Date: 2007
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Related works:
Journal Article: Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (2008)
Working Paper: Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (2006)
Working Paper: Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma (2004)
Working Paper: Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma (2004)
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