Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts
Patrick Bajari and
Steven Tadelis
RAND Journal of Economics, 2001, vol. 32, issue 3, 387-407
Abstract:
Inspired by facts from the private-sector construction industry, we develop a model that explains many stylized facts of procurement contracts. The buyer in our model incurs a cost of providing a comprehensive design and is faced with a tradeoff between providing incentives and reducing ex post transaction costs due to costly renegotiation. We show that cost-plus contracts are preferred to fixed-price contracts when a project is more complex. We briefly discuss how fixed-price or cost-plus contracts might be preferred to other incentive contracts. Finally, our model provides some microfoundations for ideas from Transaction Cost Economics. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.
Date: 2001
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Working Paper: Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts (1999)
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