The Strategic Impact of Resource Flexibility in Business Groups
Giacinta Cestone () and
Chiara Fumagalli ()
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Giacinta Cestone: Institut d'Analisi Economica (CSIC), CSEF-Universita` di Salerno, CEPR
RAND Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 36, issue 1, 193-214
We show that in business groups with efficient internal capital markets, resources may be channelled to either more- or less-profitable units. Depending on the amount of internal resources, a group may exit a market in response to increased competition, or channel funds to the subsidiary operating in that market. This has important implications for the strategic impact of group membership. Affiliation to a monopolistic subsidiary can make a cash-rich (poor) firm more (less) vulnerable to entry deterrence. Also, resource flexibility within a group makes subsidiaries' reaction functions flatter, thus discouraging rivals' strategic commitments when entry is accommodated.
Keywords: Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy; cost of capital Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure; financial ratios; value of firm Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration; Conglomerates Capital; Firm; Firms; Subsidiary (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G31 G32 L14 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rje:randje:v:36:y:2005:1:p:193-214
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