Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition

Catherine de Fontenay and Joshua Gans

RAND Journal of Economics, 2005, vol. 36, issue 3, 544-572

Abstract: We analyze vertical integration to compare outcomes under upstream competition and monopoly. This is done in a model based on the property rights approach to firm boundaries and where multilateral negotiations are modelled using a fully specified, noncooperative bargaining game. We demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoff of integrating parties in ex post bargaining; however, this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly. In contrast, where integration internalizes competitive externalities, ex post monopolization is more likely to occur under upstream monopoly than upstream competition.

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition (2004)
Working Paper: Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition (2004)
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