Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition

Catherine de Fontenay and Joshua Gans

No 904, Department of Economics - Working Papers Series from The University of Melbourne

Abstract: We analyze vertical integration in the case of upstream competition and compare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent (i.e., upstream monopoly). In so doing, we make two contributions to the modelling of strategic vertical integration. First, we base industry structure – namely, the ownership of assets – firmly within the property rights approach to firm boundaries. Second, we model the potential multilateral negotiations using a fully specified, non-cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compare outcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly. Given this, we demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoff of integrating parties in ex post bargaining; however, this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly. We also consider the potential for integration to internalize competitive externalities in a manner that cannot be achieved under non-integration; i.e., by favouring internal over external supply. We demonstrate that ex post monopolization is more likely to occur when there is an upstream monopoly than when there is upstream competition. Our general conclusion is that the simple intuition that the presence of upstream competition can mitigate and reduce the incentives for socially undesirable vertical integration is misplaced and, depending upon the strength of downstream competition (i.e., product differentiation), the opposite could easily be the case. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: L42

Keywords: vertical integration; foreclosure; monopolization; bargaining; competition. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60 pages
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition (2005)
Working Paper: Vertical Integration in the Presence of Upstream Competition (2004)
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