Merger Remedies: Federal Antitrust Service and European Competition Commission Compared

Svetlana Avdasheva () and Maria Kalinina
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Maria Kalinina: National Research Institute Higher School of Economics

Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, 2012, 141—158

Abstract: The article examines the practice of pre-merger notification and merger remedies by Russian antimonopoly authority FAS (on the example of the largest mergers approved in2006—2008) based on a comparison with the practice of the EU Competition Commission. Analysis of markets competition by FAS is shifted towards the straightforward assessment of structure (primarily— measurement of concentration). The structure of remedies isdominated by behavioral (conduct) requirements, many of them cannot be effective andsome may impose on unreasonably high risks on market participants.

Keywords: antimonopoly policy; mergers; remedies; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1211

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