The Banking Regulatory Bubble and How to Get out of It

Giovanni Ferri and Doris Neuberger

Rivista di Politica Economica, 2014, issue 2, 39-69

Abstract: We claim that we currently live in a banking regulatory bubble.We review how: i) banking intermediation theory hinges on dealing with borrower-lender asymmetry of information; ii) instead, the presence of complete information is keystone of finance theory. Next, we document how finance theory prevailed over banking intermediation theory in shaping banking regulation: This appalling contradiction is the true culprit behind lower credit standards, mounting systemic risk in banking, and macroeconomic debt overhang. Consequently, we discuss actions that, by restoring the consistency of banking regulation with the theory of banking intermediation, would make banking sounder.

Keywords: asymmetric information; relationship lending vs.transactional lending; efficient markets hypothesis; banking regulation inconsistencies; Basel II. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G14 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: The Banking Regulatory Bubble and How to Get out of It (2014)
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