The Banking Regulatory Bubble and How to Get out of It
Giovanni Ferri and
Doris Neuberger ()
No wpC01, CERBE Working Papers from CERBE Center for Relationship Banking and Economics
We claim that we currently live in a banking regulatory bubble. We review how: i) banking intermediation theory hinges on dealing with borrower-lender asymmetry of information; ii) instead, the presence of complete information is the keystone of the finance theory. Next, we document how finance theory prevailed over banking intermediation theory in shaping banking regulation: This appalling contradiction is the true culprit behind lower credit standards, mounting systemic risk in banking, and macroeconomic debt overhang. Consequently, we discuss actions that, by restoring the consistency of banking regulation with the theory of banking intermediation, would make banking sounder.
Keywords: Asymmetric Information; Relationship Lending vs. Transactional Lending; Efficient Markets Hypothesis; Banking Regulation Inconsistencies; Basel II. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G01 G14 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-pke and nep-rmg
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Journal Article: The Banking Regulatory Bubble and How to Get out of It (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lsa:wpaper:wpc01
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