Partial Takeovers: Are They Coercive?

Steve Bishop and Peter Dodd
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Steve Bishop: Australian Graduate School of Management
Peter Dodd: Australian Graduate School of Management

Australian Journal of Management, 1987, vol. 12, issue 1, 9-22

Abstract: Considerable publicity has been given to the call for further regulating partial takeover bids in Australia. This call is largely based on a premise that they coerce shareholders into accepting a takeover offer which will decrease their wealth. An alternate argument is that in a competitive market for corporate control partial takeovers will increase the wealth of shareholders, not decrease it. In this paper, data reported in the Companies and Securities Law Review Committee's Discussion Paper No. 2 is extended and evaluated in a conceptual framework. The evidence is consistent with partial takeovers being shareholder-wealth-increasing events.

Keywords: PARTIAL TAKEOVERS; MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL; SHAREHOLDER COERCION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1987
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ausman:v:12:y:1987:i:1:p:9-22

DOI: 10.1177/031289628701200102

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