Tendering and Bidding for Access: A Regulator's Guide to Auctions

Flavio Menezes, Rohan Pitchford and Andrew Wait ()
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Rohan Pitchford: Asian Pacific School of Economics and Management, Australian National University, ACT 0200.

Australian Journal of Management, 2003, vol. 28, issue 3, 345-370

Abstract: Tenders and traditional auctions are increasingly being used in regulation; as a consequence it is essential regulators have an understanding of the basics of auction theory. There is no simple prescription for the design of an auction or tender that will fit all situations; moreover, the costs from inappropriate auction and tender design can be high For example, while a second-price sealed bid auction is efficient in the absence of collusion, if participants can collude then such auction formats can result in very low revenue. Low revenue can also result with a second-price auction when there are few bidders and no reserve price.

Keywords: TENDERS; AUCTIONS; REGULATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ausman:v:28:y:2003:i:3:p:345-370

DOI: 10.1177/031289620302800307

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