Resources Rent Taxation

Richard Dowell
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Richard Dowell: Australian Graduate School of Management, University of New South Wales. This paper was funded by two Australian mineral companies. I have benefited from discussions with Chris Adam and Malcolm Fisher (UNSW), Ted Russel and David Karpin. I would also like to express my appreciation to two anonymous reviewers for their many helpful comments and suggestions.

Australian Journal of Management, 1978, vol. 3, issue 2, 127-146

Abstract: In the past, revenue from government owned mineral rights have been collected through a combination of lease auctions, ad valorem or per unit royalties, overcharges for state services, price controls and export levies. The resource rents tax (RRT) is a recently proposed royalty which purportedly has an efficiency advantage over other forms of rent collection. This paper critically reviews the arguments which have been used to justify RRT. Possible problems with RRT are discussed, some of which have been ignored in the current literature. In addition, a new royalty is introduced, which combines an auction with a two-part output-based levy.

Keywords: AUCTIONS; MINERALS; PUBLIC POLICY; RESOURCES RENT TAX; ROYALTIES; TAXATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1978
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ausman:v:3:y:1978:i:2:p:127-146

DOI: 10.1177/031289627800300202

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