Corporate governance and turnaround: Evidence from Australia

Seema Miglani, Kamran Ahmed and Darren Henry
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Kamran Ahmed: Department of Accounting and Data Analytics, La Trobe Business School, La Trobe University, Bundoora, VIC, Australia

Australian Journal of Management, 2020, vol. 45, issue 4, 549-578

Abstract: We examine the relationship between ownership and outside director attributes and corporate turnaround outcomes using matched samples of 99 turnaround and 99 non-turnaround listed Australian firms during the 2004–2015 period. Based on agency theory principles, we propose that key shareholder groups (block ownership, director ownership, institutional ownership) and outside directors are related to firm-level turnaround outcomes, and particularly changes in these attributes across decline to turnaround periods. Our results provide evidence that turnaround and non-turnaround firms differ in terms of their ownership and board composition structures, and that changes in director ownership and the degree of board independence are important in determining the likelihood of turnaround success. JEL Classification: G33, G34, M40

Keywords: Board composition; corporate governance; non-turnaround; outside director interlocks; ownership; turnaround (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ausman:v:45:y:2020:i:4:p:549-578

DOI: 10.1177/0312896220902225

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