Power Transition and Conflict Initiation

Daniel S. Geller
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Daniel S. Geller: University of Mississippi, Political Science

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1992, vol. 12, issue 1, 1-16

Abstract: Most theories of war and lesser forms of international conflict rest on assumptions of rational choice. Moreover, many of these explanations explicitly incorporate decision maker estimates of relative power among competitors. However, a major theory of great power war-power transition theory-postulates initiation by the weaker contender. This study demonstrates that among the strongest states an interactive relationship exists between the static power balance, differential growth rates in capabilities, and conflict initiation: initiation patterns are associated with changes in a state's relative military/economic power and power potential. The findings are consistent with the inherent logic of power transition theory and are consonant with an assumption of rational calculation in decisions involving conflict initiation. The results may be interpreted as reinforcing the realist contention that a shifting power balance is of critical significance among the causes of war and peace.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:12:y:1992:i:1:p:1-16

DOI: 10.1177/073889429201200101

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