Relative Bargaining Power in International Debt Negotiation: Collective Action, Sovereignty En Garde, or Mutual Partisan Adjustment?

Steve Chan
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Steve Chan: Department of Political Science University of Colorado

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1993, vol. 13, issue 1, 29-60

Abstract: This paper analyzes the strategic conduct of three classes of actors in the management of Third World debt problems. It examines the behavior and incentives of the private banks, their home governments, and their foreign governmental clients in light of perspectives on collective action, sovereignty en garde, and partisan mutual adjustment. The statistical patterns of past debt negotiation outcomes show some shortcomings of these perspectives, while at the same time pointing to other aspects of reality which can be usefully illuminated by them. Both the theoretical and empirical analyses suggest international debt management as a mixed-motive game among purposive egoists. The actors' bargaining leverage, however, differs considerably with respect to the determination of loan availability as opposed to the negotiation over the financial terms for the loans.

Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:13:y:1993:i:1:p:29-60

DOI: 10.1177/073889429301300102

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