From Desert Shield To Desert Storm: Success, Strife, Or Quagmire?

Jacek Kugler, Lewis W. Snider and William Longwell
Additional contact information
Jacek Kugler: Claremont Graduate School
Lewis W. Snider: Claremont Graduate School
William Longwell: Vanderbilt University

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1994, vol. 13, issue 2, 113-148

Abstract: This real time evaluation of decisions during the Gulf Crisis were done to establish the utility of systematic evaluations based on the tenets of the micro-economic theory of expected utility. The expected utility framework used assumes that decision-makers evaluate the costs and benefits associated with viable choices seeking the largest net gain for each group at acceptable levels of risk. The forecast and simulations shows the initial and eventual resolution based on an analysis of group preferences, potential influence and salience. The results, based on data obtained in September 1990, show, first, that Iraq would dominate oil supplies without US military intervention. Second, that US intervention was essential to solidify the coalition that eventually liberated Kuwait. Third, that Mr. Hussein could not be dislodged; and the internal dissent, culminating in the Shia' and Kurdish rebellions, would be crushed. Analysis of missed opportunities shows that the best option for peace was a Saudi Arabia led negotiated settlement with Iraq. Even if such negotiations failed they produced a most stable partnership where all actors, including Israel, backed negotiations or war. The most prominent incorrect prediction was that the Gulf Crisis could be resolved without conflict. Upon review, the reason for this error is that the analyst overstated peace despite clear model indications that war was probable. The implications are profound. If similar real time analyses proved accurate, much carnage can be avoided without diminishing policy goals. Had decision-makers anticipated that inciting domestic violence in Iraq was fruitless but dangerous to the Shia' and Kurdish minorities, would they still pursue such options? We opt to believe that they would not, or, perhaps, they would extended Desert Storm. Information provided in a timely manner makes a difference. Perhaps the policy community is too passive. Perhaps, we should risk failure in order to advance credible options dictated by knowledge. Perhaps, during the next crisis we will do so.

Date: 1994
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/073889429401300202 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:13:y:1994:i:2:p:113-148

DOI: 10.1177/073889429401300202

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Conflict Management and Peace Science from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().