Rational Choice? Crisis Bargaining Over the Meech Lake Accord

Patrick James
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Patrick James: Iowa State University

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1998, vol. 16, issue 2, 149-184

Abstract: From June 3 to 9, 1990, the Canadian federal and provincial governments bargained intensively over the final draft of a constitutional agreement known as the Meech Lake Accord. Although that crisis produced a tentative settlement, ratification ultimately failed in two provinces. The objective of the present investigation is to use an expected utility model to assess the fate and implications of the compromise that emerged at the time. This study unfolds in six stages. The first reveals why the Accord's failure is puzzling and establishes the general relevance of Canadian constitutional affairs. The second phase introduces the perspective of rational choice as a source of insight. This overview provides the foundation for the third stage, which presents an expected utility model of intergovernmental bargaining. In the fourth phase, data are assembled and the model is operationalized for the Canadian crisis of June 1990. The model's results are analyzed at the fifth stage. Sixth, and finally, general implications and priorities for future research are identified.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:16:y:1998:i:2:p:149-184

DOI: 10.1177/073889429801600203

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