Signalling in the Turkish-Syrian Water Conflict

Serdar Güner
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Serdar Güner: Bilkent University

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 1998, vol. 16, issue 2, 185-206

Abstract: This paper proposes a simple two-person game of one-sided incomplete information in extensive form to understand strategic choices made in the Turkish-Syrian linkage between water and terrorism. Turkish intelligence established Syrian support of a terrorist group that aims at an independent Kurdish state in eastern Anatolia. Yet, Turkey frequently stipulates the cessation of this support for negotiating with Syria a water agreement over the Euphrates. The game presents Turkey as a player having superior information. Syria is assumed to be uncertain about Turkish preferences with respect to the mutual conflict. This analysis identifies three pooling equilibria indicating that Syrian beliefs do not matter.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:16:y:1998:i:2:p:185-206

DOI: 10.1177/073889429801600204

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