Credible Commitments and International Cooperation: Guaranteeing Contracts Without External Enforcement

Brett Ashley Leeds
Additional contact information
Brett Ashley Leeds: Florida State University

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2000, vol. 18, issue 1, 49-71

Abstract: Understanding when and how international entities can establish beneficial cooperative agreements under anarchy is one of the most significant challenges facing theorists of international relations. In this article, I present a game-theoretic model that explains and predicts conditions under which self-enforcing agreements are possible, and conditions under which cooperation can be aided by provisions to an agreement that change the incentives of the negotiating parties. I argue, first, that the benefits and risks of unilateral defection do not always inhibit the formation of mutually beneficial agreements, and second, that even when the risks of defection are high, agreements can sometimes be constructed that mitigate this risk through provisions that act as guarantors of the agreement. By constraining their own future behavior and protecting their partners, international actors can sometimes create conditions conducive to cooperation through the contracting process.

Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/073889420001800102 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:18:y:2000:i:1:p:49-71

DOI: 10.1177/073889420001800102

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Conflict Management and Peace Science from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().