An Economic Model of Terrorism

S. Brock Blomberg, Gregory Hess and Akila Weerapana
Additional contact information
S. Brock Blomberg: Economics Department Claremont McKenna College Claremont, California, USA, bblomberg@mckenna.edu
Akila Weerapana: Economics Department Wellesley College Wellesley, Massachusetts, USA

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2004, vol. 21, issue 1, 17-28

Abstract: We develop an economic model of terrorism. Groups undertake violent activities to change the status quo when they are unable to bring about drastic political change in the face of limited access to economic opportunity. Furthermore, these groups are more likely to resort to terrorist activity when they face powerful policy-making elites who can't be uprooted easily, by legitimate means or otherwise. If, on the other hand, the elite groups currently in power are weak but can't be removed from power legitimately, the dissident groups are likely to initiate rebellion activity, such as civil wars and coups, to take over the rule of the governing elite themselves. In particular, the model exhibits multiple equilibria. For example, one equilibrium can be sustained where groups with limited access to opportunity may find it rational to engage in terrorist activities while policy-maker elites may find it rational not to engage in opening access to these groups. The result is, then, a pattern of reduced economic activity and increased terrorism. An alternative equilibrium can be sustained where access is more abundant and terrorism is reduced.

Keywords: growth; terrorism; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1080/07388940490433882 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:21:y:2004:i:1:p:17-28

DOI: 10.1080/07388940490433882

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Conflict Management and Peace Science from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().