Deterrence and System Management: The Case of North Korea

Patrick M. Morgan
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Patrick M. Morgan: University of California, Irvine, USA, pmmorgan@uci.edu

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2006, vol. 23, issue 2, 121-138

Abstract: The recent North Korean crisis is the latest phase in a lengthy U.S.-North Korean deterrence relationship. That relationship, particularly its problems and limitations, is reviewed and the effectiveness of each side's contemporary deterrence posture is assessed. It is noted that deterrence and compellence have not prevented the emergence of the North's nuclear proliferation efforts, nor has it brought North Korea a large improvement in security. The recent crisis is also examined to assess the mistakes in U.S. efforts to further pursue deterrence and compellence to end the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Lessons of the crisis for the use of deterrence for system security management are briefly discussed.

Keywords: Agreed Framework; collective actor deterrence; compellence; deterrence; Proliferation Security Initiative; six-party talks; security management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:23:y:2006:i:2:p:121-138

DOI: 10.1080/07388940600665768

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