The Pursuit of Legal Settlements to Territorial Disputes

Todd L. Allee and Paul K. Huth
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Todd L. Allee: Department of Political Science University of Illinois Urbana, Illinois, USA, tallee@uiuc.edu
Paul K. Huth: Department of Government & Politics University of Maryland College Park, Maryland, USA

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2006, vol. 23, issue 4, 285-307

Abstract: Territorial disputes are a common source of armed conflict and war, yet, during the twentieth century, governments have resolved dozens of territorial disputes through recourse to international arbitration or adjudication. In this research we consider why governments agree to international legal dispute settlement as a means of resolving territorial disputes. We put forward and test three explanations for the decision to pursue legal dispute settlement: a realist explanation, a domestic “political cover†explanation, and a legal “focal point†explanation. Results obtained from a series of generalized estimating equation (GEE) models reveal considerable support for arguments which highlight the domestic political cover function of international arbitration and adjudication.

Keywords: territorial disputes; arbitration; adjudication; dispute resolution. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:23:y:2006:i:4:p:285-307

DOI: 10.1080/07388940600972644

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