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Success Breeds Success? War Outcomes, Domestic Opposition, and Elections

Philip Arena
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Philip Arena: Pennsylvania State University State College Pennsylvania, USA, pua103@psu.edu

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2008, vol. 25, issue 2, 136-151

Abstract: War outcomes are unlikely to effect elections if the major parties did not disagree over the war. Leaders who enter into wars are more likely to be punished for defeat or rewarded for victory if the opposition did not support the government during the war. Employing original data on legislative opposition during interstate wars, this paper examines all elections since WWII in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and India. The results confirm that leaders are far more likely to be punished (rewarded) for bad (good) outcomes if the opposition did not support the war. Further, there is no direct effect of either war outcomes or the position of the opposition. It is only when considered in conjunction with the opposition's behavior that the important link between war outcomes and elections is revealed.

Keywords: accountability; costs; elections; war; opposition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:25:y:2008:i:2:p:136-151

DOI: 10.1080/07388940802007249

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