The Trade-Offs of Fighting and Investing: A Model of the Evolution of War and Peace1

Kelly M. Kadera and Daniel S. Morey
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Kelly M. Kadera: University of Iowa, Iowa City Iowa, USA
Daniel S. Morey: University of Kentucky Lexington, Kentucky, USA, daniel-morey@uky.edu

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2008, vol. 25, issue 2, 152-170

Abstract: International competition occurs in many different forms. Just as a state would be in danger if it allowed its opponent to gain a military advantage, one that falls behind a rival in an economic contest similarly faces risks. States must weigh the trade-offs between economic and military growth, as well as deciding on the best strategy to follow should war erupt. We use a formal, dynamic model to explicitly capture the trade-offs that states face in their search for security and dominance. The deductions from the model demonstrate that by considering the long-run results of a peacetime rivalry, weaker states might conclude that their only hope of winning or surviving a rivalry lies in fighting a counterforce war, explain why and how stalemates evolve during counterforce wars, and indicate that targeting industrial objectives shortens the duration of wars.

Keywords: competition; dynamic model; strategy; trade-offs; war (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:25:y:2008:i:2:p:152-170

DOI: 10.1080/07388940802007272

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