Legal Systems and Variance in the Design of Commitments to the International Court of Justice

Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Emilia Justyna Powell
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Sara McLaughlin Mitchell: Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, USA
Emilia Justyna Powell: Department of Political Science, Georgia Southern University, USA

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2009, vol. 26, issue 2, 164-190

Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between domestic legal systems and the design of commitments to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Empirical analyses demonstrate that civil law states are more willing to recognize the compulsory and compromissory jurisdiction of the World Court than common law or Islamic law states. Common law states place the highest number of reservations on their optional clause declarations, with the majority of those restrictions relating to specific areas of international law. Civil law states typically embed compromissory clauses in multilateral treaties, while common and Islamic law states prefer recognition of the ICJ's jurisdiction through bilateral treaties.

Keywords: ICJ; jurisdiction; legal systems; PCIJ; rational design; reservations; World Court (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:26:y:2009:i:2:p:164-190

DOI: 10.1177/0738894208101128

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