Institutional Flexibility in the Design of Multilateral Environmental Agreements

Christopher Marcoux
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Christopher Marcoux: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2009, vol. 26, issue 2, 209-228

Abstract: Current research on international treaties suggests that flexibility provisions can facilitate the diplomatic resolution of international environmental problems.This article advances understanding of this process by describing a typology of flexibility mechanisms found in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), and by arguing that negotiators strategically select different types of institutional flexibility mechanisms in response to different problems. Multivariate analysis of a new dataset of MEAs indicates that a wider variety of factors influence provision of institutional flexibility than many current studies consider. Specifically, power asymmetry among contracting states is shown to be the most important predictor of flexibility provisions in MEAs.

Keywords: institutional design; flexibility; multilateral environmental agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:26:y:2009:i:2:p:209-228

DOI: 10.1177/0738894208101130

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