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Territorial Issues and Recurrent Conflict

Stephen L. Quackenbush
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Stephen L. Quackenbush: University of Missouri

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2010, vol. 27, issue 3, 239-252

Abstract: It is well established that territorial issues are highly conflict prone. Furthermore, dyads encountering conflicts over territory should be expected to fight more frequently, with shorter durations of peace than other dyads. However, the growing literature examining factors leading to the recurrence of conflict has largely ignored the impact of territorial issues, focusing instead on factors such as the type of dispute settlement. In this article, I seek to examine the relationship between territorial issues, settlements, and conflict recurrence through survival analyses of the periods of peace following 2,974 dyadic militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 2001.

Keywords: duration model; imposed settlements; recurrent conflict; territory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:27:y:2010:i:3:p:239-252

DOI: 10.1177/0738894210366511

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