Bargaining power and the arbitration and adjudication of territorial claims1

Stephen E. Gent and Megan Shannon
Additional contact information
Stephen E. Gent: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
Megan Shannon: Florida State University, USA

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2014, vol. 31, issue 3, 303-322

Abstract: To examine the political factors that influence the use of legal mechanisms to resolve territorial disputes, we model the decision to pursue arbitration and adjudication as part of a bargaining process in the shadow of war. We find that arbitration and adjudication can help prevent bargaining breakdown, but states only pursue and comply with such measures when the expected ruling reflects the balance of power between them. To test the theory, we examine compliance with arbitral and adjudicated rulings on territorial claims. In line with our expectations, states are less likely to comply when the stronger disputant is asked to make greater concessions. We conclude that power politics constrains the conditions under which legal mechanisms can be used to successfully manage contentious claims over territory.

Keywords: Adjudication; arbitration; bargaining; legal dispute resolution; territorial disputes; territory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0738894213508710 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:31:y:2014:i:3:p:303-322

DOI: 10.1177/0738894213508710

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Conflict Management and Peace Science from Peace Science Society (International)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().