Up in arms! Explaining why ethnic minority organizations form militias in transitioning and post-communist Eurasian countries1

Victor Asal, Bryan R. Early and Marcus Schulzke
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Victor Asal: University at Albany, SUNY, USA
Bryan R. Early: University at Albany, SUNY, USA
Marcus Schulzke: University of Leeds, UK

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2017, vol. 34, issue 5, 485-506

Abstract: The decision by ethnic minority organizations (EMOs) to form militias is heavily influenced by the specific policies that governments adopt towards them. We theorize that, when a government makes an EMO illegal or subjects it to repression, those actions substantially increase the EMO s incentives to invest in creating an institutionalized capacity for violence. We test our theory via a quantitative analysis of militia formation using a sample population of 261 EMOs within transitioning and post-communist Eurasian countries from 1989 to 2006. Our results indicate that EMOs are far more likely to form militias if they have been repressed and/or made illegal by their governments.

Keywords: Eurasia; ethnic minority organizations; exclusion; militias; post-communist; repression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:34:y:2017:i:5:p:485-506

DOI: 10.1177/0738894215600386

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