Oil prices and interstate conflict

Cullen S. Hendrix
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Cullen S. Hendrix: Korbel School, University of Denver and Peterson Institute for International Economics, USA

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2017, vol. 34, issue 6, 575-596

Abstract: Anecdotal evidence suggests that high oil prices embolden oil-rich states to behave more aggressively. This article contends that arguments linking oil-exporter status to interstate conflict are implicitly price contingent, and tests this via a reanalysis of works by Colgan and Weeks. It finds a contingent effect of oil prices on interstate disputes, with high oil prices associated with significant increases in dispute behavior in petrostates, for which oil exports constitute more than 10% of GDP, while having a null effect in non-petrostates. Directed-dyadic tests indicate that this is due to petrostates initiating disputes, rather than becoming more attractive targets for conquest or coercion.

Keywords: Conflict; diplomacy; Iran; oil; resource curse; Russia; Venezuela (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:34:y:2017:i:6:p:575-596

DOI: 10.1177/0738894215606067

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