Are complex game models empirically relevant?

Catherine C. Langlois

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2018, vol. 35, issue 1, 3-17

Abstract: This essay on the empirical relevance of game theoretic models in International Relations is developed in three parts. First it reviews Allan and Dupont’s arguments for a tradeoff between model complexity and empirical robustness. Second, it re-conceptualizes model complexity and shifts the discussion of a tradeoff between between empirics and model complexity by considering the empirical relevance rather than the empirical robustness of a model. Finally it assesses the link between empirical relevance and complexity with reference to models in the crisis bargaining and the war and bargaining literatures.

Keywords: Empirical relevance; game theory; model complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:35:y:2018:i:1:p:3-17

DOI: 10.1177/0738894217733889

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