Trigger-happy? Military regimes and the timing of conflict

Randolph M Siverson and Richard AI Johnson
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Randolph M Siverson: University of California, Davis, USA
Richard AI Johnson: University of Strathclyde, UK

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2018, vol. 35, issue 5, 544-558

Abstract: The proclivity of military regimes and their leaders for more frequent involvement in international conflict than other autocracies has been shown in several studies. The question raised here is not whether they participate in more conflicts and disputes, but rather whether after the leaders of military regimes enter office they initiate these acts more quickly than the leaders of other types of autocracies. Drawing on three authoritarian regime typologies and examining the time to the initiation of any dispute and the initiation of violent disputes, our results show that in comparison to other authoritarian leaders a subset of military leaders is distinctly trigger-happy.

Keywords: Conflict; leaders; military regimes; survival models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:35:y:2018:i:5:p:544-558

DOI: 10.1177/0738894216673614

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