Domestic politics and the power to punish: The case of national human rights institutions

Ryan M. Welch

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2019, vol. 36, issue 4, 385-404

Abstract: Why do states give institutions the ability to legally punish them? While past research focuses on international pressure to delegate authority to third parties, I argue that domestic politics plays a key role. By viewing domestic politics through a principal–agent framework, I argue that the more accountable individual legislators remain to the public, the more likely it is that the legislature will delegate legal punishment authority. I focus on National Human Rights Institutions—domestic institutions tasked with protection and promotion of human rights—to build the argument. Electoral institutions that decrease monitoring of legislator agents, or institutional makeup that allows the executive to displace the public as the principal lead to National Human Rights Institutions without punishment power. Using Bayesian logistic analyses I test four hypotheses, all of which are in agreement with the argument.

Keywords: Accountability; elections; enforcement; human rights; institutions; NHRIs; principal–agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:36:y:2019:i:4:p:385-404

DOI: 10.1177/0738894217704632

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