Reconsidering economic leverage and vulnerability: Trade ties, sanction threats, and the success of economic coercion

Timothy M Peterson

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2020, vol. 37, issue 4, 409-429

Abstract: I contend that a state’s position in the global trade network affects the initiation and outcome of sanction threats. A state is vulnerable, and thus more likely to acquiesce, when its trade has low value to trade partners that are well connected to the global trade network. Conversely, a state has leverage that could motivate the use of sanction threats when its trade has high value to trade partners that are otherwise not well connected. Capturing leverage/vulnerability with an interaction between two network centrality measures, results indicate that vulnerability is associated with acquiescence to sanctions, while leverage is associated with threat initiation.

Keywords: Interdependence; sanctions; trade; vulnerability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:37:y:2020:i:4:p:409-429

DOI: 10.1177/0738894218797024

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