Deterring threats and settling scores: How coups influence respect for physical integrity rights

Travis B. Curtice and Daniel Arnon
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Travis B. Curtice: Department of Political Science, Emory University, USA
Daniel Arnon: Department of Political Science, Emory University, USA

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2020, vol. 37, issue 6, 655-673

Abstract: Do coups affect patterns of political violence like violations of physical integrity rights? Do these patterns vary depending on whether coups succeed or fail? We argue that political uncertainty from coups decreases respect for physical integrity rights. Post-coup regimes preemptively repress as a show of strength to deter threats from those excluded from power and settle scores through cycles of retaliation. Additionally, we argue that the retaliation cycle of score settling will last longer after a failed coup because of informational problems that emerge when targeting opponents. Employing data on coups and physical integrity rights from 1980 to 2015, we find coup failure and success to be negatively associated with respect for physical integrity rights, and the cycle of retaliation lasts longer after failed coups.

Keywords: Conflict; coups; human rights; repression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:37:y:2020:i:6:p:655-673

DOI: 10.1177/0738894219843240

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