Selectorateâ€™s information and dictatorâ€™s accountability
Mario Gilli () and
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Yuan Li: University of Duisburgâ€“Essen, Duisburg, Germany
Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2021, vol. 38, issue 5, 524-542
In this paper, we study the evolution of accountability in autocracies and the consequent progressive economic and political mismanagement in terms of information changes. It is often held to be true that better information means greater accountability. On the contrary, we show that in dictatorships, better information might imply worse choices by a dictator. The basic idea is that the reputation mechanism underlying accountability only works if there is enough noise surrounding the dictatorâ€™s possible type. As the selectorateâ€™s information about the dictatorâ€™s actual type increases over time, the incentives for the dictator to behave correctly vanish.
Keywords: Accountability; autocracy; dictator; information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:38:y:2021:i:5:p:524-542
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