Judicial independence and refugee flights

Saadet Ulasoglu Imamoglu

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2023, vol. 40, issue 2, 111-133

Abstract: Recent studies suggest that a lack of judicial independence increases the risk of violent action, diminishing the incentives to solve disputes peacefully. However, violent action is not the only option when judiciaries are under the control of the executive. I argue that individuals become refugees in countries with non-independent judiciaries, losing their hope that violations of rules by the executive or privileged groups will be tried fairly. Using data from 181 countries over the 1976–2015 period, I find evidence that the lack of judicial independence leads countries to produce more refugees than others.

Keywords: Refugee flights; forced displacement; fear of victimhood; judicial independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:40:y:2023:i:2:p:111-133

DOI: 10.1177/07388942211072433

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