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Sticking it out: Instability, regime type, and personnel withdrawals from UN peacekeeping operations

Molly M. Melin and Jacob D. Kathman
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Molly M. Melin: Department of Political Science, Loyola University Chicago, USA
Jacob D. Kathman: Department of Political Science, SUNY Buffalo, USA

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2023, vol. 40, issue 4, 398-418

Abstract: What explains UN member-state personnel withdrawals from peacekeeping operations? Withdrawals can occur at the behest of contributor states, as contributions are voluntary. We argue that withdrawal is motivated by violence in the peacekeeping operation host state. Research shows that well-resourced missions improve the prospects of success. Personnel withdrawals are dangerous, as they are more likely when continued deployments are needed. We thus need to understand why some states resist withdrawing in the face of instability. We argue that democracies are more stalwart than their counterparts given their constituency interests, the democratic benefits of peacekeeping and the political cover offered to democratic policymakers.

Keywords: United Nations; peacekeeping; personnel withdrawals; democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:40:y:2023:i:4:p:398-418

DOI: 10.1177/07388942221147862

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