Trust, cooperation, and the tradeoffs of reciprocity

Kyle Haynes and Brandon K. Yoder
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Kyle Haynes: Department of Political Science, Purdue University, USA
Brandon K. Yoder: School of Politics and International Relations, 2219Australian National University, Australia

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2024, vol. 41, issue 1, 26-46

Abstract: This article demonstrates that foreign policies of reciprocity entail previously unrecognized tradeoffs. The conventional wisdom in international relations holds that reciprocating another state's cooperative and non-cooperative actions can simultaneously promote cooperation and allow states with compatible preferences to build trust. We present a model that synthesizes recent work on signaling and cooperation to identify a tension between the goals of building long-term trust and inducing short-term cooperation. Specifically, a receiver's highly reciprocal strategy generates strong incentives for hostile senders to behave cooperatively, which reduces the credibility of cooperation as a signal of benign intentions. Conversely, a less reciprocal strategy increases the credibility of senders’ cooperative signals, but forgoes the benefits of short-term cooperation with hostile states. Thus, uncertain receivers often face a tradeoff between inducing cooperation and eliciting credible signals. We illustrate these tradeoffs in pre-First World War British foreign policy, and highlight the article's policy implications for contemporary US–China relations.

Keywords: Signaling; cooperation; trust; reciprocity; reassurance; US-China; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:41:y:2024:i:1:p:26-46

DOI: 10.1177/07388942231162335

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