The harsh face of the empire by invitation: Coups in the US world order

Giacomo Chiozza and Lena Khalifa
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Giacomo Chiozza: 47767American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
Lena Khalifa: 47767American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates

Conflict Management and Peace Science, 2024, vol. 41, issue 2, 110-131

Abstract: Where were coups more likely to occur in the US world order? The US has occasionally resorted to coups to realign the foreign policy preferences in allied nations with its own preferences. This article explains why coups were more likely in countries where the leaders enjoyed an incumbency advantage that thwarted the ability of potential successors to gain power through regular channels of leadership turnover. That was more likely to be the case in presidential than in parliamentary democracies, and more likely in personalistic, military, or single-party regimes than in autocracies with multiparty legislatures.

Keywords: coups; multiparty legislatures; parliamentary democracy; presidential democracy; US world order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:compsc:v:41:y:2024:i:2:p:110-131

DOI: 10.1177/07388942231210295

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